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 OPINION 
                      
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal arises from an order dismissing a personal 
injury suit without prejudice after the plaintiff failed to serve 
a summons upon the defendant within 120 days of filing the 
complaint as required by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  The issue of whether, subsequent to a recent rule 
change, Rule 4(m) permits a district court to extend time for 
service even absent a showing of good cause is one of first 
impression at the federal appellate level.  We conclude that, 
under the former rule, the district court did not abuse its 
  
discretion in refusing to extend time beyond the 120 days within 
which service was to be effected after finding no good cause 
present.  Nevertheless, because we conclude that the new rule 
affords a district judge greater discretion, we remand to the 
district court for reconsideration on this issue only.  
Additionally, we will affirm the order of the district court 
granting summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants.  
Finally, it was not error to deny plaintiff's motions for a 
default judgment and to compel discovery.     
 
 I. 
 A.  Factual Background 
 Plaintiff David Petrucelli ("Petrucelli")1 was employed 
by American Fuel Harvester in East Bangor, Pennsylvania, where he 
was involved in recycling demolition materials.  The recycling 
process consisted of obtaining materials from demolished 
buildings, and dumping the material into an impact rotor crusher 
machine ("rotor crusher").  The rotor crusher chopped and 
pulverized the material into smaller pieces which were then 
discharged from the bottom of the rotor crusher.  The material 
was discharged through a transition chute to a vibrating feeder, 
and then to a hopper on the discharge conveyor.  All of the 
component parts of the recycling machine, including the rotor 
                     
1
.  Tracy Petrucelli was also a plaintiff in the suit, claiming 
loss of consortium.  For purposes of this appeal, both David and 
Tracy Petrucelli will be referred to collectively as 
"Petrucelli."  
  
crusher, were ordered by American Fuel Harvester from defendant 
Jake Diel Construction Machinery, Inc. ("Jake Diel"). 
 Jake Diel designed and manufactured the recycling 
machine and later assembled it on the premises of American Fuel 
Harvester.  Many of the component parts of the recycling machine, 
including the transition chute, the vibrating screen, the machine 
chassis, the control booth, and the discharge conveyor, were made 
by Jake Diel.  Jake Diel bought for incorporation into the 
recycling machine other components, such as the rotor crusher 
made by defendant Bohringer & Ratzinger ("Bohringer").  Although 
the rotor crusher and the discharge conveyor were all part of the 
same recycling machine, there were three independent components 
between the rotor crusher and the discharge conveyor.  From the 
recycling machine's control booth, most of the various conveyor 
belts could be individually turned on and off, but from that 
vantage point, most or all of the discharge conveyor could not be 
seen.  Bohringer did not participate in the decisions regarding 
the design or the location of the control booth and its operating 
controls. 
 On August 8, 1989, while working with the recycling 
machine, Petrucelli noticed that the conveyor was not functioning 
properly.  One of his co-workers went to the control booth to 
turn off the machine.  After the machine was turned off, 
Petrucelli attempted to dislodge some wire caught in the roller 
of the discharge conveyor of the recycling machine.  While 
performing this task, one of his co-workers turned on the 
  
recycling machine.  Petrucelli's left arm was torn off after 
being pulled into the conveyor mechanism.    
 
 B. Procedural History 
 Petrucelli filed a complaint on April 1, 1991, and 
thereafter an amended complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  In the amended 
complaint, Petrucelli asserts claims for negligence, strict 
products liability, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, and 
punitive damages.  Petrucelli enlisted the aid of Attorney 
Process Service ("APS") to assist in serving process upon the 
defendants.  He informed APS that the nameplate on the machinery 
indicated that Jake Diel was located in both Texas and Oklahoma.  
APS advised Petrucelli that "Jake Diehl (sic) Construction" could 
be served through the Secretary of State of Oklahoma, but that 
"Jake Diehl (sic) Construction and Machinery Co." was not subject 
to service in Texas (March 26, 1991 letter from APS; App. at 66.) 
because its corporate charter was revoked by the Secretary of 
State of Texas on November 1, 1988.  Inexplicably, prior to 
sending the summons and complaint, Petrucelli never confirmed or 
otherwise verified with the Secretary of State of Oklahoma that 
Jake Diel was a corporation in good standing with the State of 
Oklahoma, capable of being served through the Secretary of State 
of that jurisdiction. 
 On July 25, 1991, Petrucelli sent a copy of the summons 
and complaint and a copy of a Notice of Acknowledgment of Receipt 
of Summons and Complaint to the Secretary of State of Oklahoma, 
  
who received these documents on July 29, 1991.  On March 19, 
1992, the Secretary of State of Oklahoma issued a certificate of 
proof of service which stated that it had been served as the 
agent for "Jake Diehl (sic) Construction and Machinery Co." on 
August 5, 1991.  The certificate of service also indicated that 
on August 7, 1991, the Secretary of State of Oklahoma sent the 
summons and complaint to an address in Hereford, Texas, via 
certified mail, return receipt requested, but that the letter had 
been returned undelivered on August 14, 1991.  However, 
Petrucelli contends that in August of 1991, he communicated with 
the offices of the Secretary of State of Oklahoma by telephone, 
and was verbally assured by someone in that office that Jake Diel 
had been served via certified mail.  
 Meanwhile, Bohringer impleaded Excel Recycling & 
Manufacturing, Inc. ("Excel") as a third-party defendant, 
believing that Jake Diel had legally changed its corporate name 
to Excel.2  After Jake Diel failed to respond, Petrucelli, in May 
of 1992, moved for a default judgment against Jake Diel or 
alternatively to extend time for service.  Both of these motions 
were denied, resulting in the dismissal of Jake Diel from these 
proceedings as a direct defendant.3 
                     
2
.  Excel confirmed in its answer on March 6, 1992 that it was 
formerly known as Jake Diel Construction Machinery, Inc. prior to 
Jake Diel's filing of a Name Change Certificate on December 29, 
1989 (and was incorrectly named in Petrucelli's amended complaint 
filed October 19, 1991, as Jake Diel Construction Machine, Inc.).  
3
.  The district court denied entry of a default judgment for 
failure to properly serve the defendant Jake Diel.  While the 
suit was dismissed without prejudice, the statute of limitations 
  
 Defendant Bohringer subsequently moved for summary 
judgment.4  Petrucelli opposed Bohringer's motion and filed a 
motion seeking to compel Bohringer: (1) to answer the 
interrogatories that Excel had served on Bohringer; and (2) to 
produce the documents that Excel had previously demanded of 
Bohringer.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor 
of Bohringer and denied Petrucelli's motion.  
 Petrucelli appeals the orders of the district court:  
(1) denying his motions for default judgment against Jake Diel 
or, alternatively, to extend the time for service on Jake Diel; 
(2) granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Bohringer; 
and (3) denying Petrucelli's motion to compel discovery from 
Bohringer.  We will affirm the orders of the district court. 
  
 II.  
 
 A.  Denial of Motion for Default Judgment 
 Petrucelli argues that the district court erred by not 
granting his motion for a default judgment against Jake Diel.  
Assuming that proper service of process was effected on Jake 
Diel, we can reverse the district court only if we find that it 
abused its discretion in denying the motion for a default 
(..continued) 
on the underlying causes of action had run at the time of 
dismissal of Jake Diel from these proceedings. 
4
.  The amended complaint also named Teco Electric and Machine 
Company ("Teco") as an additional defendant.  Teco also moved for 
and was granted summary judgment.  Petrucelli did not oppose this 
motion, and thus Teco is not a party to this appeal. 
  
judgment.  See Farzetta v. Turner & Newall, Ltd., 797 F.2d 151, 
153 (3d Cir. 1986).  Insofar as this issue pertains to whether 
Jake Diel was properly served, our standard of review is plenary.  
Stranahan Gear Co. v. NL Industries, Inc., 800 F.2d 53, 56 (3d 
Cir. 1986).  See also Grand Entertainment Group, Ltd. v. Star 
Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 1993) ("We exercise 
plenary review over issues concerning the propriety of service 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.").   We note that if a 
default judgment had been entered when there had not been proper 
service, the judgment is, a fortiori, void, and should be 
vacated.  Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., 756 F.2d 14, 19 
(3d Cir. 1985). 
 Petrucelli filed the complaint on April 1, 1991.  
Pursuant to former Rule 4(j), the predecessor to Rule 4(m), of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he had 120 days (until July 
30, 1991) to serve the summons and complaint upon Jake Diel.5  
The return receipt from the mailing indicates that the Secretary 
of State of Oklahoma received the summons and complaint on July 
29, 1991, just within the 120-day limit.  Petrucelli contends 
that since he served Jake Diel's authorized agent, service was 
effective.  However, as of November 1, 1988, Jake Diel was no 
longer a foreign corporation authorized to conduct business in 
Oklahoma.  Because the Secretary of State of Oklahoma was no 
                     
5
.  Although not even mentioned or pled by the attorney for 
Petrucelli, Rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was 
amended, and the successor subdivision, Rule 4(m), went into 
effect on December 1, 1993. 
  
longer the authorized agent to accept service of process on 
behalf of Jake Diel, we conclude that serving the Secretary of 
State was ineffective as service on Jake Diel.  Thus, Jake Diel 
was not served within the 120-day period required by the rule.  
Indeed, it would have been error as a matter of law for the 
district court to enter a default judgment against Jake Diel when 
it was never served. 
 
 B.  Denial of Motion to Extend Time for Service 
 Petrucelli next argues that the district court should 
have granted his alternative motion for an extension of the 120-
day limit to serve Jake Diel, pursuant to Rule 4(j).  When 
Petrucelli argued his motion to extend time for service before 
the district court in May of 1992 and when the district court 
entered its memorandum order in August of 1992 denying 
Petrucelli's motion, former Rule 4(j) had not yet been amended.  
In 1992, Rule 4(j) read in pertinent part: 
 Summons:  Time Limit for Service.  If a 
service of the summons and complaint is not 
made upon a defendant within 120 days after 
the filing of the complaint and the party on 
whose behalf such service was required cannot 
show good cause why such service was not made 
within that period, the action shall be 
dismissed as to that defendant without 
prejudice upon the court's own initiative 
with notice to such party or upon motion. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j) (1991) (emphasis added).  Under this rule, a 
district court was required to dismiss a case if service of 
  
process was not effected within the 120 day period, unless the 
plaintiff showed good cause for the delinquency.6 
 As of December 1, 1993, Rule 4(j) was amended and 
redesignated as Rule 4(m).  While the change in designation from 
(j) to (m) is of no import, the language in this subdivision was 
substantially modified.  Although counsel for Petrucelli failed 
to bring this substantive change to our attention, our own 
research has revealed this critical change in the rule. 
 Initially, we question whether Rule 4(m) applies to 
these proceedings in light of the fact that service of process 
was attempted in 1991, two years prior to the rule change.  If 
former Rule 4(j) still applies to this case and we conclude that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
there was no good cause shown for failing to timely serve Jake 
Diel, we would have no choice but to affirm the order of the 
district court dismissing this case.  However, we are guided by 
the order of the Supreme Court which stated, "the foregoing 
                     
6
.  Normally, dismissing the case without prejudice or extending 
the time for service will have the same practical effect, 
assuming that the statute of limitations has not run.  In either 
event, the plaintiff has the opportunity at the proverbial 
"second bite."  If the case is dismissed, the plaintiff simply 
has to refile the complaint and thus becomes entitled to a new 
120 day period within which to effect service of process.  
Similarly, if an extension of time is granted, then the plaintiff 
has the opportunity to effect service within the new time limit 
imposed by the court.  The situation changes dramatically, 
however, when a case is dismissed, even without prejudice, and 
the statute of limitations has run.  Here, the plaintiff is 
precluded from refiling the action.  Thus, assuming good cause, 
dismissing a case without prejudice is not an appropriate remedy 
after the statute of limitations has lapsed. 
  
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall take 
effect on December 1, 1993, and shall govern . . . insofar as 
just and practicable, all proceedings in civil cases then 
pending."  See The Order of the United States Supreme Court 
Adopting and Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (April 
22, 1993).  Because we believe it to be "just and practicable," 
we conclude that Rule 4(m) applies retroactively to these 
proceedings.   
 Determining that Rule 4(m) applies to the case before 
us does not, however, end our inquiry.  In this case of first 
impression before a federal Court of Appeals, we must decide the 
manner in which a district court should now proceed when 
employing a Rule 4(m) analysis.  Rule 4(m) states in relevant 
part: 
 Time Limit for Service.  If service of the 
summons and complaint is not made upon a 
defendant within 120 days after the filing of 
the complaint, the court, upon motion or on 
its own initiative after notice to the 
plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without 
prejudice as to that defendant or direct that 
service be effected within a specified time; 
provided that if the plaintiff shows good 
cause for the failure, the court shall extend 
the time for service for an appropriate 
period. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (1993) (emphasis added).  As mentioned 
previously, the former rule required the court to dismiss the 
case absent a showing of good cause.  We read the new rule to 
require a court to extend time if good cause is shown and to 
allow a court discretion to dismiss or extend time absent a 
  
showing of good cause.  We reach this conclusion for several 
reasons. 
 Initially, we find that the plain language of the rule 
itself explains that in all cases, the court has the option of 
dismissing the action or extending time for service.  The fact 
that the word "shall" is used along with the disjunctive "or" in 
the first clause indicates that the court has discretion to 
choose one of these options.  As an exception to this general 
provision, the second clause notes that if good cause exists, the 
district court has no choice but to extend time for service.  
Thus, the logical inference that can be drawn from these two 
clauses is that the district court may, in its discretion, extend 
time even absent a finding of good cause. 
 Next, we find that the Advisory Committee 
note on the Rule 4(m) amendment to be 
instructive.  The Committee explained:  
 The new subdivision explicitly provides 
that the court shall allow additional time if 
there is good cause for the plaintiff's 
failure to effect service in the prescribed 
120 days, and authorizes the court to relieve 
a plaintiff of the consequences of an 
application of this subdivision even if there 
is no good cause shown.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) advisory committee's note (1993) (emphasis 
added).  Thus, the "even if" language of the note indicates that 
  
the district court may extend time for service where there is no 
good cause shown. 
 We hold that as a result of the rule change which led 
to Rule 4(m), when entertaining a motion to extend time for 
service, the district court must proceed in the following manner.  
First, the district court should determine whether good cause 
exists for an extension of time.  If good cause is present, the 
district court must extend time for service and the inquiry is 
ended.  If, however, good cause does not exist, the court may in 
its discretion decide whether to dismiss the case without 
prejudice or extend time for service. 
 The Advisory Committee note provides some guidance as 
to what factors the district court should consider when deciding 
to exercise its discretion to extend time for service in the 
absence of a finding of good cause.  Although the list is not 
exhaustive, the Committee explained that, "[r]elief may be 
justified, for example, if the applicable statute of limitations 
would bar the refiled action, or if the defendant is evading 
service or conceals a defect in attempted service."  Id.  
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).7 
                     
7
.  Some may interpret the Advisory Committee note as expanding 
the concept of good cause to include a greater number of 
situations where "relief may be justified."  We decline to adopt 
such a position.  Specifically, we are troubled by the language 
in the note which may be interpreted by some to mean that good 
cause exists every time the statute of limitations has run and 
the refiling of the action would be barred.  We caution against 
such a myopic reading of the Advisory Committee note for several 
reasons. 
 First, when mentioning what "relief may be granted," 
the note refers back to a prior sentence which states that the 
rule "authorizes the court to relieve a plaintiff of the 
  
 We hold that a district court may not consider the fact 
that the statute of limitations has run until after it has 
conducted an examination of good cause.  If the district court 
determines that good cause does not exist, only then may it 
consider whether the running of the statute of limitations would 
warrant granting an extension of time.  We emphasize that the 
running of the statute of limitations does not require the 
district court to extend time for service of process.  Rather, 
absent a finding of good cause, a district court may in its 
discretion still dismiss the case, even after considering that 
(..continued) 
consequences of an application of this subdivision even if there 
is no good cause shown."  Thus, the examples of "relief" that are 
provided in the note should be factored into the analysis only 
after a determination has been made that good cause is lacking.  
Second, the note indicates that "relief may be justified" if the 
statute of limitations has run.  If, in fact, the running of the 
statute constituted good cause, the district court would be 
required to grant relief.  Instead, here the Advisory Committee 
note indicates that granting relief is not mandatory.  Third, 
later in the same paragraph, the Advisory Committee refers to and 
describes "[a] specific instance of good cause."  If, in fact, 
the running of the statute of limitations was to be construed as 
a "specific instance of good cause," the Advisory Committee would 
have characterized it in the same manner.  Finally, holding that 
good cause exists any time the statute of limitations has run 
would effectively eviscerate Rule 4(m) and defeat the purpose and 
bar of statutes of repose.  Pursuant to Rule 4(m), if good cause 
is shown, the district court must extend time.  If we were to 
construe the Advisory Committee note as instructing a district 
court to find good cause whenever the statute of limitations has 
run, the district court would be obligated to extend time.  
Instead of having 120 days within which to effect service of 
process, this reading of Rule 4(m) would extend both the 120 days 
and the statute of limitations of every cause of action 
indefinitely. 
  
the statute of limitations has run and the refiling of an action 
is barred.8 
 We begin our inquiry into the proper resolution of this 
case by determining whether the district judge was correct in 
concluding that Petrucelli failed to establish good cause for not 
serving Jake Diel in a timely manner.  Petrucelli contends that 
he has shown good cause for his failure to serve Jake Diel within 
the required time.  We review the district court's determination 
that good cause has not been shown for abuse of discretion.  
Lovelace v. Acme Markets, Inc., 820 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 965, 108 S. Ct. 455 (1987); Braxton v. United 
States, 817 F.2d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 1987).9 
 Petrucelli argues that the following circumstances 
constitute good cause:  (1) he was under the mistaken belief that 
the defendant had been served since he spoke to someone in the 
Office of the Secretary of State of Oklahoma via telephone and 
was verbally assured that proper service was effected; and (2) he 
                     
8
.  We express no opinion as to what factors, in addition to 
those listed in the Advisory Committee note, a district court may 
consider when deciding whether to extend time for service or 
dismiss a case.  We simply note that because the statute of 
limitations would bar the refiled action here, it would be 
appropriate for the district court to consider this factor, 
assuming (as we later conclude) there is no showing of good 
cause.  
9
.  The dissent argues that under Rule 4(m) the determination of 
good cause is a factual one to be reviewed by the clearly 
erroneous standard.  We disagree.  The good cause determination 
itself is still a discretionary judgment to be exercised by the 
district court.  Thus, it is proper to review this decision for 
an abuse of discretion. 
  
was told by APS that Jake Diel could not be served in Texas, but 
could only be served in Oklahoma.  Petrucelli maintains that his 
and APS' errors in serving Jake Diel are attributable to the 
confusion caused by the change in the corporate name from Jake 
Diel to Excel.   
 Petrucelli, however, made several inexcusable errors.  
First, he unreasonably relied on a verbal assurance from some 
unknown individual in the Office of the Secretary of State of 
Oklahoma to the effect that Jake Diel had been served.  Second, 
his attempted service included a Notice of Acknowledgement Form, 
which was never completed and returned.  Petrucelli did not 
question why the acknowledgment form was not returned.  A prudent 
attorney exercising reasonable care and diligence would have 
inquired into the matter further when it was obvious that the 
acknowledgment form was not forthcoming.  Third, Petrucelli 
claims that sending a mailing to Texas would be pointless in 
light of the assurances from APS that Jake Diel was no longer 
doing business in Texas.  However, Jake Diel (later renamed 
Excel) was continuously and without interruption doing business 
in the state of Texas from April 1, 1969 until the present.  
Fourth, the record is barren of any written inquiry made by the 
plaintiff of the Secretary of State of Oklahoma, or any response 
thereto, which would indicate whether Jake Diel was a corporation 
  
in good standing in that state (or that it was previously a 
corporation in good standing whose charter had been revoked).10 
 We have previously held that reliance upon a third 
party or on a process server is an insufficient basis to 
constitute good cause for failure to timely serve, and is also an 
insufficient basis for granting an extension of time to effect 
service.  Braxton, 817 F.2d at 242.  We have also held that 
"`[h]alf-hearted' efforts by counsel to effect service of process 
prior to the deadline do not necessarily excuse a delay, even 
when dismissal results in the plaintiff's case being time-barred 
due to the fact that the statute of limitations on the 
plaintiff's cause of action has run."  Lovelace, 820 F.2d at 84.  
Even when delay results from inadvertence of counsel, it need not 
be excused.  Id.  Further, we have previously cautioned that, 
"`[t]he lesson to the federal plaintiff's lawyer is not to take 
any chances.  Treat the 120 days with the respect reserved for a 
time bomb.'"  Braxton, 817 F.2d at 241 (citation omitted).11 
                     
10
.    The certificate from the Oklahoma Secretary of State is 
dated March 19, 1992.  In August of 1991 Petrucelli could not 
have relied upon this document.  
11
.  We recognize that both Lovelace and Braxton were decided 
under former Rule 4(j).  However, because of our earlier holding 
that the running of the statute of limitations is not an element 
of a good cause analysis, we are satisfied that the holdings of 
Lovelace and Braxton remain intact.  In fact, our analysis of 
Rule 4(m) in no way impacts any of our prior decisions that 
articulate the standard for good cause.  Rather, the change which 
exists in Rule 4(m) modifies the procedure employed by the 
district court after a determination as to good cause has been 
made.  
  
 The facts of this case are quite similar to Lovelace, 
where we found that it was inappropriate for plaintiff's counsel 
to rely upon verbal assurances of the process server where 
counsel was not in possession of any written proof of service.  
820 F.2d at 84-85.  Here, Petrucelli relied on the verbal 
assertions of an individual in the Office of the Secretary of 
State of Oklahoma.  He failed to inquire further when the 
acknowledgment form was not received.  Petrucelli cannot rely 
upon his belief that the defendant had been served when he had in 
hand no proof or indication of service.  We conclude that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that 
Petrucelli has not shown good cause for failing to timely serve 
the defendant. 
 Next, the district court must consider whether any 
other factors warrant extending time even though good cause was 
not shown.  Because Rule 4(m) had not yet been adopted at the 
time the district court decided this issue, the district court 
was forced to dismiss this case after finding that no good cause 
existed and was prohibited from considering whether an extension 
of time should be granted despite a lack of a showing of good 
cause.  Now, however, the district court is not faced with having 
to dismiss Petrucelli's case and is not prohibited from extending 
time for service.12  Although the district court did not abuse 
                     
12
.  Subsequent to oral argument we received a motion from Jake 
Diel regarding Petrucelli's pleadings in a pending proceeding in 
which Petrucelli is plaintiff and his process server, APS, is 
defendant.  Because we are limited to the extant record in 
Petrucelli's action against Jake Diel in this case, we cannot 
consider the material which Jake Diel now offers regarding 
  
its discretion, in light of Rule 4(m), we will remand this issue 
to the district court to exercise its discretion as to whether 
the case should be dismissed or an extension of time granted 
within which service of process can be effected.   
    
 C.  Granting of Summary Judgment in Favor 
 of Defendant Bohringer & Ratzinger 
 We exercise plenary review over the district court's 
grant of summary judgment and apply the same test employed by the 
district court.  United States v. Capital Blue Cross, 992 F.2d 
1270, 1271-72 (3d Cir. 1993).  Summary judgment shall be granted 
when there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c).  Moreover, the mere existence of some evidence in 
support of the non-moving party will not be sufficient to support 
a denial of a motion for summary judgment; there must be enough 
evidence to enable a jury to reasonably find for the non-moving 
party on the issue.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 
249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986).  Where, as here, the non-
movant bears the burden of proof on the issue which is the 
subject of the summary judgment motion, and is confronted by the 
movant's argument that the facts established through the 
discovery process do not support the claim, the party must 
(..continued) 
whether Petrucelli exhibited good faith in attempting to serve 
Jake Diel.  The district court may in its discretion consider the 
arguments made in Diel's motion and in Petrucelli's response, if 
any.  We express no view as to the merits of Diel's motion, which 
we deny without prejudice for the above reasons. 
  
identify evidence of record sufficient to establish every element 
essential to the claim.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). 
 It is well established that federal courts sitting in 
diversity must apply the substantive law of the state whose law 
governs the action.  Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 
S. Ct. 817, 822 (1938); Griggs v. Bic Corp., 981 F.2d 1429, 1431 
(3d Cir. 1992).  All parties agree that the substantive law of 
Pennsylvania applies to this litigation. 
  Petrucelli asserts a claim for: (1) negligence; (2) 
strict liability for failure to warn and/or design defect; (3) 
misrepresentation; (4) breach of express and implied warranties 
of fitness for purpose and merchantability; and (5) punitive 
damages.13  In order for Petrucelli to prevail on this appeal, he 
must point to evidence which establishes every element of at 
least one of the above claims. 
 In order to defeat summary judgment on the negligence 
claim, Petrucelli must prove: (1) a duty requiring the defendant 
to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) failure to conform 
to such standard; (3) a causal connection between the failure to 
conform and an injury; and (4) actual loss or damage.  Griggs, 
981 F.2d at 1434 (emphasis added).  A claim for strict products 
                     
13
.  Petrucelli has not briefed nor argued on appeal that the 
district court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment 
with regard to the claim for punitive damages.  Because plaintiff 
has not briefed this issue for appeal, he has waived review of 
that portion of the district court's decision.  See Brenner v. 
Local 514, United Broth. of Carpenters, 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d 
Cir. 1991). 
  
liability has two elements: (1) that the product is defective; 
and (2) that the defect was a proximate cause of the injuries.  
Griggs, 981 F.2d at 1432 (emphasis added).  In order to prevail 
on a claim of misrepresentation, Petrucelli must prove: (1) 
justifiable or reasonable reliance; and (2) a causal connection 
between the representations and the alleged harm.  Gunsalus v. 
Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (emphasis 
added). 
 All three of the above claims require a causal 
connection between the wrongful act and the alleged harm.   As we 
have noted, Bohringer manufactured the rotor crusher, but 
Petrucelli's arm was amputated in the discharge conveyor.  
Although the rotor crusher and the discharge conveyor were both 
part of the same recycling machine, there were three independent 
components between the rotor crusher and the discharge conveyor.  
It is uncontradicted that the component part (the rotor crusher) 
manufactured by Bohringer was not involved in Petrucelli's 
accident.  There being no causal relationship between Bohringer's 
product and the accident, Bohringer cannot be held liable on a 
theory of negligence, strict products liability, or 
misrepresentation.  In short, one of the necessary elements of 
these claims, causation, is not present. 
 The district court properly made findings that 
Petrucelli has offered no evidence of an express warranty.  As 
such, we will only consider the claim of breach of implied 
warranties of fitness and merchantability.  An implied warranty 
of fitness for a particular purpose applies "[w]hen the seller at 
  
the time of contracting has reason to know: (1) any particular 
purpose for which goods are required; and (2) that the buyer is 
relying on the skill or judgment of the seller to select or 
furnish suitable goods."  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2315 (1984).  
The Pennsylvania Commercial Code provides that an implied 
warranty of merchantability requires that the product be "fit for 
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."  13 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2314(b)(3) (1984).  Moreover, in order to 
prevail under Pennsylvania law on a claim for breach of either 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or warranty of 
merchantability, a plaintiff must show that the product was 
defective.  Altronics of Bethlehem, Inc. v. Repco, Inc., 957 F.2d 
1102, 1105 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 Petrucelli alleges that the rotor crusher was defective 
since (1) it lacked adequate warning systems which would alert, 
by sounding an alarm or a bell, personnel in the proximity of the 
recycling machine prior to the machine actually starting movement 
and (2) the design and location of the control booth did not 
allow adequate visibility of the component parts of the recycling 
machine. 
 Under Pennsylvania law, it is recognized that a 
manufacturer's duty to warn is limited when it supplies a 
component of a product that is assembled by another party and the 
dangers are associated with the use of the finished product.  
Jacobini v. V. & O. Press Co., 527 Pa. 32, 39, 588 A.2d 476, 478 
(Pa. 1991) (citing Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag 
Aktiengesellschaft, 523 Pa. 1, 9, 564 A. 2d 1244, 1248 (1989)).  
  
The court in Jacobini reasoned that the manufacturer of the 
component part cannot be expected to foresee every possible risk 
that might be associated with the use of the completed product 
and to warn of dangers in using that completed product.  Id. at 
40, 588 A.2d at 480. 
 Nevertheless, it is possible under certain 
circumstances for a component manufacturer to be held liable for 
a failure to warn.  For example, in one case, a plaintiff was 
severely injured after diving into a shallow pool.  Fleck v. KDI 
Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1992).  He 
contended that the pool and the replacement pool liner were 
defective because they did not have depth markers or "No Diving" 
warnings.  In holding the pool liner manufacturer liable, we 
concluded that since the pool liner manufacturer knew that its 
product would ultimately be incorporated into a pool, the 
potential risk of failing to affix warning labels was reasonably 
foreseeable.  Id. at 118. 
 Thus, the question before us is whether it is 
reasonably foreseeable to a component manufacturer that failure 
to affix warning devices to its product would lead to an injury 
caused by another component part, manufactured by another 
company, and assembled into a completed product by someone other 
than the initial component manufacturer.  We conclude that 
Bohringer could not be expected to foresee that failure to affix 
alarms or bells on the rotor crusher would lead to someone being 
injured by the discharge conveyor, another component part of the 
recycling machine.  Thus, we do not accept Petrucelli's argument 
  
that Bohringer had a duty to warn about the dangers of rotor 
crusher.  Therefore, Petrucelli has failed to prove the rotor 
crusher was defective for failure to warn of possible injury.   
 Next, Petrucelli argues that there was a design defect 
because the control booth was placed in a such a manner that a 
full view of the discharge conveyor was obstructed.  We do not 
agree.  Petrucelli has offered no evidence refuting Bohringer's 
position that it did not manufacture the control booth and did 
not provide mechanisms to attach it to the rotor crusher.  In 
addition, Petrucelli failed to contradict evidence that Jake Diel 
had previously placed control booths for other companies in 
similar locations even prior to its use of Bohringer rotor 
crushers, and would place the control booth in any location 
according to the demands of the customer.  We conclude that 
plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to support 
his claim of breach of warranty of fitness and merchantability.14    
 D.  Denial of Motion to Compel Discovery 
 Petrucelli argues that the district court erred by not 
allowing him to adopt, as his own, the discovery request that 
Excel as third-party defendant served upon Bohringer.15  
Petrucelli contends that he was implicitly given permission to 
                     
14
.  Additionally, Petrucelli has failed to present sufficient 
evidence of the statutory elements to support his claim of 
implied warranty of fitness.  There is, in fact, no evidence that 
he relied at any time on the skill or judgment of Bohringer. 
15
.  As noted in supra note 2, since December 29, 1992, pursuant 
to a name change, Jake Diel is now known as Excel, and we will 
refer to it as such. 
  
adopt the interrogatories and request for production of documents 
that Excel served on Bohringer because no objections were filed 
to his attempted adoption.  Furthermore, he speculates that if 
his motion to compel had been granted, he would have discovered 
the evidence necessary to preclude the grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Bohringer. 
 In order to succeed on a motion to compel discovery, a 
party must first prove that it sought discovery from its 
opponent.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(A)16  The district court 
concluded that Petrucelli was less than diligent in his discovery 
requests.  The district court found that interrogatories and a 
request for documents were served on Bohringer by Excel in May of 
1992.  Yet, the record is devoid of any indication of discovery 
requests served by Petrucelli.  In September and October of 1992, 
representatives of Excel and Bohringer were deposed, during which 
time Petrucelli deposed a representative of Bohringer for forty-
five minutes.  Petrucelli's contention that the grant of his 
motion to compel would produce evidence sufficient to preclude 
summary judgment in favor of Bohringer is suspect in light of the 
fact that Petrucelli had upwards of two years to conduct 
discovery during which time his discovery consisted solely of 
this one deposition.  In February of 1993, almost ten months 
                     
16
.  Rule 37(a)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
states in relevant part: 
 
The motion must include a certification that the movant has in 
good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party not 
making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure 
without court action. 
  
after Excel served discovery requests on Bohringer, Petrucelli 
sent a letter to Bohringer's attorney seeking, first, to receive 
responses to the discovery requests Excel served in May of 1992, 
and second, purporting to adopt the discovery requests that Excel 
served on Bohringer.  This was Petrucelli's only attempt to seek 
discovery; he initiated no independent, direct discovery requests 
of Bohringer.  On June 14, 1993, Bohringer filed its motion for 
summary judgment and on June 28, 1993, Petrucelli filed his 
motion to compel discovery. 
 The district court concluded that Petrucelli failed to 
comply with Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which 
requires a written stipulation when modifying procedures 
governing discovery.  Moreover, in addition to not complying with 
the rule, Petrucelli was lax in not attempting to adopt the 
discovery requests until February of 1993, almost ten months 
after Excel served the request.  Furthermore, the district court 
observed that Petrucelli did not file his motion to compel 
discovery proactively but instead waited until after Bohringer 
had first filed its motion for summary judgment (some four months 
after Petrucelli attempted to adopt the discovery requests 
previously served by Excel).   
 We apply the abuse of discretion standard when 
reviewing orders regarding the scope and conduct of discovery.  
Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 447 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations 
omitted).  After a thorough review of the record, we conclude 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Petrucelli's discovery requests.  First, Petrucelli never 
  
forwarded interrogatories, nor a request for production of 
documents, to Bohringer.  Thus, pursuant to Rule 37, the 
prerequisite for compelling discovery was never fulfilled.  
Second, there was never any written agreement between counsel by 
which Petrucelli could adopt Excel's discovery requests of 
Bohringer.  We observe, as did the district court, that plaintiff 
has failed to comport with Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure which requires a written stipulation when modifying 
procedures governing discovery.  Third, this case had been 
ongoing for over twenty-six months at the time that Bohringer 
filed its motion for summary judgment.  At no time during this 
period did Petrucelli forward any discovery requests to 
Bohringer.  We will therefore affirm the order of the district 
court denying the motion to compel discovery.17 
 
 III. 
 A default judgment against Jake Diel could not be 
entered since the complaint was never served.  Thus, we will 
affirm the order of the district court denying plaintiff's motion 
seeking a default judgment.  We will also affirm the decision of 
the district court which concluded that Petrucelli has failed to 
demonstrate good cause in not timely serving Jake Diel.  However, 
                     
17
.  We also note that plaintiff has failed to comply with Local 
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(f) of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania which states that, "[n]o motion or other application 
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing 
discovery or pursuant to this rule shall be made unless it 
contains a certification of counsel that the parties, after 
reasonable effort, are unable to resolve the dispute."   
  
in light of Rule 4(m), we will remand Petrucelli's motion to 
extend time for service to the district court for further 
consideration in light of our above analysis.  Summary judgment 
was properly entered in favor of Bohringer on all of plaintiff's 
claims against it, as there was no genuine issue of fact in 
dispute.  Therefore, we will affirm the order of the district 
court granting summary judgment to Bohringer.  Finally, since the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in monitoring 
discovery, we will affirm the order of the district court denying 
plaintiff's motion to compel discovery.   
  
 
 
David Petrucelli; Tracy A. Petrucelli, Husband and Wife v. 
Bohringer and Ratzinger, GMBH Ausdereitungsanlagen; Jake Diel 
Construction Machine, Inc.; Teco Electric and Machine Company, 
Ltd. v. Excel Recycling & Manufacturing, Inc., No. 94-1425 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge, Concurring and Dissenting. 
 I agree that summary judgment was properly granted to 
Bohringer and Ratzinger, and that the motion to compel discovery 
was properly denied, and hence I join in Parts IIA, C & D of the 
majority opinion.  I also agree that the motion for default 
judgment was properly denied.  I cannot, however, join fully in 
Part IIB because I believe that good cause to extend the time for 
service of process beyond 120 days was present in this case, and 
hence I would remand with instructions to grant the 120 day 
extension.18 
                     
18
.  The majority reviews the district court's decision as to the 
presence of good cause under an abuse of discretion standard.  I 
do not believe the adoption of such a standard satisfactorily 
accommodates the Congressional enactment of Rule 4(m).  Under the 
former Rule 4(j), the decision whether to extend the time for 
service, while predicated on the existence of good cause, was 
solely entrusted to the district judge's discretion.  
Importantly, under the Rule 4(j) regime, what the reviewing court 
did was to analyze the district court's entire decision whether 
to extend the time for service or to dismiss the action.  
Correspondingly, the appellate review of the district court's 
decision under Rule 4(j) was appropriately conducted under an 
abuse of discretion standard.  See Lovelace v. Acme Markets, 820 
F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 965 (1987); 
Braxton v. United States, 817 F.2d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 1987).   
    However, as the majority correctly recognizes, under Rule 
4(m) the inquiry is divided into two steps.  If, as a factual 
matter, good cause is found, the district court is duty-bound to 
extend the time for service; in the absence of good cause, the 
district court has discretion as to whether or not to dismiss or 
extend the time for service.  Given this regime, the majority's 
  
 I. 
 In determining whether Petrucelli has set forth a 
showing of good cause, the majority measures the action of 
Petrucelli and his counsel against the principles laid down in 
Lovelace and Braxton.  See Lovelace v. Acme Markets, 820 F.2d 81 
(3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 965 (1987); Braxton v. 
United States, 817 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1987).  Those cases also 
involved instances where plaintiff's failure to properly execute 
service resulted from counsel's ill-advised reliance on 
representations made by an employed process server.  Braxton, 817 
F.2d at 242 ("The facts, therefore, present a scenario of 
unexplained delinquency on the part of the process server and 
lack of oversight by counsel."); Lovelace, 820 F.2d at 84 
(finding "misplaced reliance upon the word of the specially-
appointed process server").  In my view, additional factors which 
present a clearer showing of good cause take this case out of the 
(..continued) 
review of both decisions for an abuse of discretion is anomalous.  
While the district court's latter decision should be reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion, it appears that the good cause 
determination itself has become a purely factual one, which 
should appropriately be reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard, since under the first step of the Rule 4(m) analysis 
the district court has no discretion.   
     In sum, this Congressionally mandated schema leaves no 
alternative but to review the district court's good cause 
determination under a clearly erroneous standard.  
Notwithstanding this concern, I do not believe the distinction is 
outcome determinative here, for I would conclude that the 
district court erred in finding that Petrucelli failed to present 
a showing of good cause under either a clearly erroneous or an 
abuse of discretion standard of review. 
 
  
Braxton/Lovelace category, and more closely align it with our 
later opinion in Consolidated Freightways v. Larson, 827 F.2d 916 
(3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1032 (1988). 
 In defining the scope of the "good cause" exception, we 
have equated it with the concept of "excusable neglect" of Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).  Dominic v. Hess Oil, 841 F.2d 513, 517 (3d 
Cir. 1988); see also 2 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 
4.18[2] (2d ed. 1994) ("As for Rule 6(b)(2), there would seem to 
be no practical difference between good cause for not serving 
process and failure to serve process through excusable 
neglect.").  Indeed, Petrucelli has requested an extension of 
time under Rule 6(b)(2), which requires the district court to 
grant an extension of time, "where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) (emphasis 
added).  We have described excusable neglect as requiring "'a 
demonstration of good faith on the part of the party seeking an 
enlargement and some reasonable basis for noncompliance within 
the time specified in the rules.'"  Hess Oil, 841 F.2d at 517 
(quoting Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, § 1165 
(1987)).  Both elements are present in this case.  
 II. 
 By all accounts, Petrucelli has acted in good faith.  
In addition, Petrucelli has provided two reasonable bases, of a 
type not present in either Braxton or Lovelace, for his counsel's  
noncompliance: (1) his counsel's difficulty in locating the 
  
defendant, Jake Diel Corporation, now Excel ("Jake Diel") within 
120 days resulted from the corporation's recent name change to 
Excel; and (2) the office of the Secretary of State of Oklahoma 
had informed counsel that service of the defendant could be 
effectuated through that office.   
 Petrucelli and his counsel were initially under the 
impression that Jake Diel was a Texas Corporation.  App. at 66.  
However, when they were unable to find a listing for Jake Diel in 
Texas, they turned their attention to the records of the 
neighboring state of Oklahoma.  App. at 61-70.  When they made 
inquiry, officials in the office of the Oklahoma Secretary of 
State stated that Jake Diel was listed to do business in Oklahoma 
and that service could be effected through their office as Jake 
Diel's agent.  App. at 33.  The Oklahoma officials also stated to 
counsel that their records reflected that Jake Diel had been 
ousted by the Secretary of State of Texas on 11/1/91 for failure 
to file the necessary reports.  App. at 32.  In response, 
Petrucelli's counsel acting through process server, APS 
International, Ltd., effected mail service upon the Secretary of 
State of Oklahoma, who shortly thereafter informed them that Jake 
Diel had been served via certified mail.  App. at 33.  It was 
only after the 120 day time period had run that Petrucelli's 
counsel realized that the defendant had not in fact been validly 
served through the Oklahoma Secretary of State.  App. at 34; 67-
68.   
  
 The majority contends that "the record is barren" of 
any correspondence with the Oklahoma Secretary of State to 
support Petrucelli's contention of excusable neglect.  Maj. Op. 
at 16.  I disagree.  Attached to this dissent is a certificate 
from the Oklahoma Secretary of State received by Petrucelli 
certifying its acceptance of plaintiff's service of process on 
Jake Diel's behalf.  App. at 69.  While the majority correctly 
points out that Petrucelli's counsel failed to receive Form 18-A 
(as is required to effectuate service made pursuant to FRCP 
4(C)(2)(c)(ii)), I do not believe that such a mistake vitiates 
the presence of good cause under the circumstances of this case.  
At all critical times, counsel was under the impression that the 
defendant could have been and was served through the Oklahoma 
Secretary of State.  
 In my view, the conduct of Petrucelli's counsel is more 
analogous to the conduct of counsel in Consolidated Freightways 
Corp. v. Larson, 827 F.2d at 919, than in Braxton or Lovelace.  
In Consolidated Freightways we distinguished both Braxton and 
Lovelace and found that the district court had abused its 
discretion by failing to find excusable neglect where an 
attorney's clerical error resulted in a failure to file a timely 
notice of appeal, holding that such an error was excusable 
neglect since, 
 counsel's error was not the result of 
professional incompetence; that counsel is 
not attempting to create a facile excuse by 
which to extend the time for appeal, indeed 
counsel gained no advantage by the 
  
misdirection; and that the type of human 
error here involved, though certainly 
avoidable, is neither readily foreseeable nor 
capable of anticipation by counsel.  
 
Consolidated Freightways, 827 F.2d at 919-20.  I find this 
analysis to be applicable here.  Petrucelli's counsel's failure 
to locate the defendant within 120 days, while avoidable, was not 
sufficient to justify denying Petrucelli his day in court.  See 
Wright & Miller, supra, at § 1137 ("If good cause is measured too 
restrictively, then too many good faith plaintiffs may be treated 
harshly.").    
 Essentially, the reason Petrucelli was unable to 
properly effectuate service was that the defendant had changed 
its name from Jake Diel to Excel.  The question of the role of a 
defendant's name change in a finding of good cause was not 
addressed by the Braxton and Lovelace panels and has, to date, 
never been addressed by this court.19  While as the majority 
points out, it might have been possible for counsel to have 
located the defendant through certain sophisticated searches the 
failure to do so does not constitute inexcusable neglect 
considering counsel's good faith efforts.    
 Petrucelli's counsel, acting through APS International, 
searched the Texas corporate records for a Jake Diel Corporation 
                     
19
.  Moreover, there is no reported federal opinion addressing 
such a situation absent evidence of intentional evasion of 
service.  See, e.g. Ruiz Varela v. Sanchez Velez, 814 F.2d 821 
(1st Cir. 1987) (remanding to the district court to reconsider 
the plaintiff's claim of good cause).   
 
  
and understandably was not able to locate the address of the re-
named defendant.  App. at 66.  The Consolidated Freightways panel 
distinguished Braxton on similar grounds -- the presence of a 
good faith effort on the part of counsel to comply with the 
procedural time limit.  See Consolidated Freightways, 827 F.2d at 
921 ("Unlike the attorney in Braxton, counsel in this matter made 
substantial good faith efforts to comply."); see also PaineWebber 
Inc. v. Hartman, 921 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1990) (reversing a  
district court's denial of an extension of time as an abuse of 
discretion where "the notice of appeal was untimely despite 
counsel's diligent efforts at compliance").  
 Moreover, the facts of this case present an even more 
compelling instance of excusable neglect than even Consolidated 
Freightways, for there the failure to file a timely appeal was 
the result of a clerical error made by counsel or someone under 
counsel's control.  In this case, the plaintiff was misled into 
believing that service could be made in Oklahoma not only by 
their hired process server, but by the Oklahoma Secretary of 
State, who indicated that service of process could and had been 
made on the defendant through that office.  In support of this 
reliance, Petrucelli points to his statement to the district 
court during the 120 day period that Jake Diel had been served, 
made in connection with his request for an extension of time in 
order that proper service could be effectuated under 
  
international law upon the German-based defendant, Bohringer & 
Ratzinger.  App. at 141-45. 
 In discounting Petrucelli's reliance on representations 
made by the Oklahoma Secretary of State's office, the majority 
equates reliance on representation made by a hired process server 
with representations made by a government official.  In support 
of this proposition the majority relies on an overly broad 
reading of Braxton, concluding that "we have previously held that 
reliance upon a third party or on a process server is an 
insufficient basis... for granting an extension of time to effect 
service.  Braxton, 817 F.2d at 242."  Maj. Op. at 16 (emphasis 
added).  But Braxton dealt with representations made by a process 
server hired by an attorney, and does not deal with, or even 
mention, representations by "third parties."  It would be 
astonishing indeed if Braxton stood for the proposition that any 
reliance on third parties, including government officials holding 
themselves out as agents of a defendant, would not suffice to 
establish good cause.   
 In addition, defendant Jake Diel was not prejudiced, 
because it had actual notice of the commencement of the 
litigation through the service of the cross-claim by the co-
defendant, Bohringer & Ratzinger.  The First Circuit has 
recognized the danger of applying the service of process time 
period "harshly and inflexibly," in the absence of prejudice to 
the defendant.  U.S. v. Ayer, 857 F.2d 881, 885-86 (1st Cir. 
  
1988) ("Congress, we believe, intended Rule 4(j) to be a useful 
tool for docket management, not an instrument of oppression.").  
As was true in Ayer, this case presents "no meaningful 
demonstration of any cognizable prejudice resulting to defendants 
from the passage of additional time."  Id.   In the absence of 
prejudice, Petrucelli's failure to locate defendant Jake Diel, 
given its change in name and the misleading representations by 
government officials, constitutes good cause. 
 III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the district 
court erred in failing to extend for good cause the time for 
service.  As I see it, the majority gives a narrow and wooden 
reading of good cause which might deny the plaintiff, who lost 
his left arm in an accident involving Jake Diel's machine, from 
pursuing his claim against a defendant who had actual notice of 
the suit.  As Justice Black reminded us, some 40 years ago, the 
"principal function of procedural rules should be to serve as 
useful guides to help, not hinder, persons who have a legal right 
to bring their problems before the courts."  Order Adopting Rules 
of the U.S. Supreme Court, 346 U.S. 945, 946 (April 12, 1954).  
Considering the substantial good faith efforts of Petrucelli's 
counsel to serve the defendant in this action, I believe that 
good cause to extend the time for service of process beyond 120 
days is present.  I would therefore reverse and remand with 
instructions to grant an extension of 120 days within which to 
  
effect service on defendant Jake Diel.  To that extent, I 
respectfully dissent. 
